Henry Kissinger gives us a really thick book about, first, the ebb and flow of international relations among the European superpowers from Richelieu to World War Two, and then, the prosecution of American foreign policy through the period of the Cold War. I just finished reading it, having assigned it to myself as homework (along with a shelf of other diplomacy books) when I passed the Foreign Service Exam.
The book's mission as outlined above involves going over a lot of history, much of which I was already familiar with, but in a way that ties it together usefully - although at a level of simplification, imposed of necessity by the need to keep the book under a thousand pages, that occasionally calls into question the accuracy of the author's perception of national, not to say global, events, and compels him at other times to omit some ideas that might enhance understanding of the book's themes.
In addition to the history lessons, there were a fair amount of facts that were new to me, correlations I had not drawn myself, and insights into motivations with potential applications to analogous present and future situations - enough of these that it always seemed worthwhile to me to keep reading.
The second part of the book, about the Cold War, naturally enough included a good deal more of the autobiographical; a couple of chapters seemed more directed at answering the many critics of Kissinger's policies while in office than at informing the student of international relations.
One of Kissinger's main philosophical premises throughout the book is that American foreign policy has, throughout the period of the nation's international engagement, been what he terms "legalistic" or "Wilsonian" - i.e., (perhaps excessively) focussed on allegedly universal principles. Americans have internalized Kant's assertion: "Das Problem der Staatserrichtung ist, so hart wie es auch klingt, selbst für ein Volk von Teufeln (wenn sie nur Verstand haben), auflösbar. [The problem of state-building is, hard as it seems, solvable even for a race of devils - if only they have reason.]" And the American ideology applies this not only to relations among individuals in the state, but to the relations among states (and their constituent individuals) in the international system.
You know, along those lines, I always remember my reaction to the Dayton talks that ended the Bosnian War. Specifically, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina that came out of those talks has specific provisions relating to the various ethnic groups, such as the three-member presidency with one member from each group. At the time, although recognizing that this type of explicitly-defined power-sharing solved a lot of Bosnia and Herzegovina's particular problems, I thought it strange that such an arrangement should be not only written into law but into the constitution itself. Of course, I was only 15 at the time, but I do still feel that a Constitution "should" be a law of fundamental, universal applicability. I had a similar reaction to a complex arrangement outlined by Betsy John at Vienna in 2000 for securing global peace by a system of overlapping geographic, economic and cultural groupings. That system might have worked, but it lacked the elegance of a framework that would be eternally and universally pertinent, regardless of the vagaries of shifting relative economic strength or regionally dominant powers.
So I don't know if I came by these "legalist" criteria for evaluating solutions by growing up American, or if I'm just naturally the sort logic-driven, Enlightenment-era rationalist personality type to whom universal principles naturally appeal. Both, probably.
Moving back to the book review. It would seem presumptive of me, with a seven-year-old bachelor's degree in International Relations and a scant ten months' experience in the Foreign Service, to dispute the conclusions of the former Secretary of State. I do take issue with some of his analysis, mostly from a perspective of interpretation, but I'll save specific arguments for when I meet him. ;)
In the meantime, one quibble that I will allow myself to express here is basically stylistic. Kissinger is constantly discussing what "would have happened" if country X had adopted policy Y, often in ways that seemed to me, subjectively, to be somewhat smug - as if the author would have done a better job at running international relations than the leaders he writes about. This is made more annoying when, at one point, he dismisses intellectual historical what-iffing as pointless, then goes on to continue engaging in it every couple pages for the rest of the book. Kissinger's leitmotif of defending the idea that countries should follow their "national interest" had lead him to defend a historical course of action that, in his own analysis, increased the likelihood of conflict, but he casually passes over that analysis as a meaningless conjecture - whereas, by implication, all the conjectures he does not qualify in that way must, I guess, be quite meaningful.
Another question that gave me food for thought throughout the book was this very concept of national interest. Kissinger likes the phrase "balance of power." His thesis is that Americans often ignore the fact that nations have interests and should pursue those rather than vague universal principles that leave themselves open to subjective interpretation in various situations. But he does not explore the question of where the national interest comes from, beyond the conception of it as territorial expansion and control over resources in the sections on colonial-era European diplomacy. He notes that this understanding of national interest must be revised in the post-colonial world, but does not really answer, from what I could glean, the question as to what new definition should replace it. Nonetheless, countries should still be out for their own national interests.
For instance, at one point Kissinger seems to suggest that the United States should oppose any future developments that might lead to another country or combination of countries (Europe, Russia, an alliance between Japan and China...) to supersede it as the predominant global power, even to the extent of weakening both sides through direct confrontation, as long as we have a good chance of keeping the number one position. Does that hold water? Is our goal, in fact, to promote global peace and progress, or is it to hold on as long as possible to the top place on the scoreboard in a giant real-life version of Risk? I realize my phrasing of the question is leading, but actually I can see the merits both points of view, although I think this is one of those where it can't be had both ways - obviously, to a very large extent, we can do both (policies geared toward maintaining US leadership are also the very policies that will make our country and the world more peaceful and more productive), but philosophically, a mutually exclusive choice between the two outlooks can be easily envisioned. As for my own opinion, I think the UK is in a pretty good position now, for example, despite having lost an empire that covered a quarter of the globe. On the other hand, as another great man once said, "I am an American."